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Abstract. The subject of this paper is the relationship between the social and the 
psychological, with emphasis on the scientific basis of strengthening the influence of 
psychology on the understanding of the economic sphere of social life. In this regard, 
the paper gives a critical review of different concepts  of economics as the science of 
behavior, i.e. its rootedness in the science of behavior. Justification of efforts to make 
economics retain its traditional distance from psychology is supported by the idea of 
the necessary recognition of interactive relationships and unintended consequences of 
behavior of economic actors. At the same time, the scientific relevance of the notion 
that the study of economic phenomena should be approached from the aspect of their 
social autonomy, uniqueness, and specificity is substantiated by a set of epistemological 
and logical inconsistencies of views of one-way causality from the psychological to the 
social, thereby focusing the methodological starting point of modern economic theory 
in the direction of denying attempts to identify the individualistic with the psychologistic 
method.  
Key words: psychologism, the science of behavior, methodological individualism, 
institutional individualism.  
INTRODUCTION 
Economic literature has, to a considerable extent, accepted the idea of economics as 
the science of behavior, and that the science dealing with the study of human behavior is 
important for its successful development. The supremacy of the psychological factors for 
the purposes of comprehension and explanation of economic phenomena, as well as the 
acceptance of the assumption that psychology is the basis of the overall philosophy and 
all social sciences, is generally described by the concept known as psychologism, while 
the term “psychological imperialism” is used primarily in terms of equivalent counterbalance 
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to “economic imperialism”. One of the earliest known authors who advocated a strong 
influence of psychology was John Stuart Mill (1806-1873). In his opinion, the laws of society 
are nothing but actions and passions of human beings, i.e. the laws of individual human nature 
(Mill, [1843] 1974, pp. 879, 907). Contribution to the psychological determination of the 
subject of economics belongs to the definition provided by Lionel Robbins (Robbins, 1962, p. 
16), stating that “economics is the science which studies human behavior as a relationship 
between ends and scarce means which have alternative uses”. As the economic science is 
currently still dominated by mainstream economics, which constantly confirms its scientific 
status and superiority over other forms of economic thinking (Manić, 2009, p. 146), this 
understanding of the subject of economics strengthened the position of neoclassicism and 
made it retain the unchanged method and roots – methodological individualism, balance, 
and efficiency. 
Contrary to this definition of economic science and its inherent view that the functioning 
of the economic system can be explained by focusing on the behavior of individuals as the 
starting point, there is an idea about economics as a science with its own subject, independent 
of any science of behavior. The focus here is on the affirmation and popularization of efforts 
aimed at preserving the traditional distance of economics from psychology, which bases its 
analytical framework on the correct understanding of the economic ontology. Therefore, the 
aim of this paper is to reflect on the relevance of the standpoint, according to which 
economics can, under the impact of psychology, lose autonomy and specificity of its subject. 
This aim will be achieved by testing the hypothesis that there are problems in economics, 
which are not related to the sphere of behavior and cannot be reduced to the “action” of 
psychological laws in the economic sphere. In this regard, the research will focus on the issue 
of the concept of society and social phenomena, with special emphasis on logical and 
empirical sustainability of the view that the study of economic phenomena should be 
approached from the point of their social autonomy, uniqueness, and specificity. Arguments 
about one-way causality between “the psychological” and “the social” will be confronted with 
the ideas about the dynamic wholeness and integrity of the economic system, and the related 
specificity of the subject of economics. To this end, emphasis will be placed on the 
affirmation of those theoretical approaches that challenge the beliefs on the equalization of the 
individualistic with the psychologistic method, taking into account the results of unintended 
effects of individual actions in the circumstances of the inextricable links between economic 
actors and their institutional environment. 
1. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE SOCIAL AND THE PSYCHOLOGICAL  
Generally speaking, there are two extreme views of the relations between social sciences 
and psychology. Onthe one hand, there is a strong trend of strengthening the position of 
psychologism, which assumes that psychology is the basis of the overall philosophy and all 
social sciences. On the other hand, the dignity of the social sciences could be defended by the 
thesis that they are relatively independent of the psychological assumptions, and that 
psychology can be treated not as the basis of all the social sciences, but as one of the social 
sciences (Popper, [1957]1961, p. 142). 
The first concept is based on the belief that psychologism rests on the idea of 
reductionism, according to which the “higher level” phenomena can be explained by the 
“lower level” phenomena, which ultimately means that all phenomena will be explained in 
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Fig. 1 Table of reduction 
Although the very nature of science strives towards unique knowledge, which is, in 
itself, a form of reductionist understanding of the phenomenon, it is clear that it is 
impossible to reach a level that means a reduction of all sciences to the level of physics 
(Popper & Eccles, 1983; Kauffman, 2008). Among the arguments used to contest 
reductionism in science, one has to emphasize the view that starts from the concept of 
downward causation (Campbell, 1974). It refers to the existence of a causal effect in the 
sense that the “higher level” structure can influence the “lower level” elements, which, 
inter alia, disputes the existence of one-way causality from “the psychological” to “the 
social”, i.e. refutes the idea on reducing “the social” to “the psychological”. The second 
argument highlights the fact that social phenomena are not subject to individual choice, 
but that they occur as a result of interactions that take place between individuals, where 
each individual has limited power to influence them. Accordingly, it can be concluded 
that psychology is irrelevant to social theory, since the interpretation of what one has 
chosen to do is not helpful in explaining the phenomena that no one chose and that are 
the consequences of interactive activities of a large number of individuals. 
Based on the foregoing, it can be concluded that the problem of individual behavior is 
of a technical nature, bearing in mind primarily that it is a choice of means to achieve 
goals. In contrast, the problem of theoretical social science is not of a technical nature 
(Neumann & Morgenstern, 1953,  p. 9), while not denying that individuals usually 
experience the achievement of their goals as a technical problem. A key challenge for the 
social sciences is that individuals, following different goals, fail to establish control over 
the final outcome of interactions. Although individuals start economic activity in order to 
overcome the situation of insufficient satisfaction and maximize their usefulness, that 
process cannot be realized independently and in isolation. Therefore, from the perspective 
of social sciences, the key problem is the one of coordination, not optimization. Their 
task is to explain how coordination is achieved between mutually dependent individual 
goals and plans, which, among other things, implies the need to explain the functioning 
of spontaneous order. 
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The issue of explicative primacy can go in the opposite direction, when primacy is 
given to “the social” in relation to “the psychological”. At first glance, it is a form of 
antireductionism (Golubović, 2011, p. 135), since the holistic understanding of the 
functioning of interactive relationships implies that the properties of a given system 
cannot be explained solely by the characteristics of its component parts. However, 
although the methodological holism enabled the creation of highly relevant concepts of a 
number of socio-economic phenomena (Kitanović & Petrović, 2008, p. 10), there is 
reason to fear that its uncritical use is nothing more than a kind of reductionism in 
economic research (Hodgson, et al., 1994, p. 64). Firstly, due to the lack of precision, the 
use of holistic concepts must be constantly controlled by using the methods of 
observation and, on this basis, respect for all the specificities and concrete instances in 
the development of social structures. Otherwise, holism, separated from its empirical 
base, can easily become “loose” and uncontrolled speculation (Wilber & Harrison, 1978, 
p. 83). 
As another argument against the primacy of the social over the psychological, there is 
the fact that social collectives must always assume the existence of individuals, who can 
create and consciously reform institutions. At the same time, we have to assume that 
individuals follow certain rules of behavior, i.e. that the behavior of individuals is 
strongly influenced by the rules and events (Dossi & Nelson, 1994, p. 157). It turns out 
that the rigid position in defining the primary explanatory factor necessarily raises the 
question of “infinite regression”, which entails constant movement within a vicious 
circle, without any possibility to come out of it. In fact, from the perspective of extremely 
conceived holistic methodological procedure, individuals‟ goals can be explained by the 
action of institutions. However, is it possible to ignore the fact that these institutions 
emerged as a result of the synergistic effect of some previous individuals, whereby those 
previous individuals also acted under the guise of some “older” institutions, etc.? Hence 
it follows that any determination on the issue of primacy – whether institutional or 
individual – is analogous to the question of what came first – the chicken or the egg 
(Hodgson, 1988, p. 64). 
The problem of “infinite regression” in the context of debate on the primacy of the 
psychological or the social, in relation to the interpretation of the institutional changes, 
among other things, includes taking a stance on the character of human nature and 
psyche. Specifically, institutional changes from the perspective of psychologism are 
caused by changes in human nature. This, however, brings to the fore the issue of the 
causes of changes in human nature itself. Supporters of reductionism will look for the 
causes at the lower level, and may bring them in connection with the consequences of 
biological evolution. However, this answer seems rather implausible, given that evolution 
takes place too slow to “count on” relatively frequent institutional changes. At the same 
time, the idea that the human mind actually adapts to the functioning of the institutions is 
a serious problem facing the advocates of psychologism. In the event that such arguments 
are “declared” correct, then, as stated by Hudík (2011, p. 149), it can be concluded that 
social phenomena are not the product of psychological laws, but that, on the contrary, 
they are the ones that shape the human mind. 
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2. PSYCHOLOGISM AND METHODOLOGICAL INDIVIDUALISM  
The intention of the supporters of psychologism was probably not motivated by 
advocating psychological determinism. Their primary aspiration was more focused on the 
affirmation of methodological individualism as “zero” method, which is the necessary 
starting point for explaining the social phenomena. Therefore, the question arises: if the 
concern of those who are engaged in social science (economics in particular) is 
inextricably linked with the observance of the principle of methodological individualism, 
does the rejection of psychologism simultaneously deny methodological individualism? 
In trying to answer this question, one can focus on the attitudes of Popper and Hayek, 
the distinguished supporters of methodological individualism. For Popper (Popper, 
[1957] 1961, pp. 136, 157), methodological individualism is “irrefutable doctrine” that 
we use in order to explain social phenomena starting from individuals, their goals, 
beliefs, attitudes, expectations, actions, and interactions. However, this kind of 
methodological position should be distinguished from the psychologism of John Stuart 
Mill, which was, according to Popper, correct to the extent to which it opposed 
methodological collectivism, insisting that all social phenomena must be seen as 
something that stems from the decisions and actions of individuals. However, Popper 
calls into question the point of psychologism that the choice of individualistic method 
actually comes down to the use of psychologistic method (Udehn, 2002, p. 487), 
considering that the principle of methodological individualism does not necessarily imply 
the adoption of a psychological method. On the contrary, this principle can be combined 
with the view according to which social sciences are relatively independent from 
psychological assumptions (Popper, [1957] 1961, p. 142). 
The reasons why he denies psychology as the basis of social science are associated 
with the following: (i) “human nature” varies considerably with social institutions, and 
(ii) social sciences mainly deal with unintended consequences of actions (Hudík, 2011, p. 
154). As the unintended consequences of individual actions (Hayek, 1952) are mainly 
identified with the concept of spontaneous order, it is necessary to consider Hayek‟s 
understanding of the social sciences. Specifically, Hayek was aware that social sciences 
are not sciences of behavior, but sciences of spontaneous order (or sciences of 
“unintended consequences” of behavior, as he sometimes called them) (ibid., p. 153). The 
error was, according to him, that the representatives of the social sciences often tolerated 
the notion that the goal of social sciences was to explain the conscious actions of 
individuals. This is, if achievable at all, the task of psychology. In the social sciences, 
conscious actions are just facts, and all they need to do about them, according to Hayek, 
is to identify them and sort out how to respond to the task. The problems that they are 
trying to respond to occur to the extent to which the conscious actions of many 
individuals produce unintended results. In contrast, if social phenomena did not show a 
different “face” in relation to the one conceived by individuals, then there would be no 
room for theoretical social sciences, and there would only be problems of psychology 
(Hayek, 1952, p. 39). However, in reality, there is a social order that is not designed or 
controlled by the human mind (Kirzner, 1982), in which the individual wishes and 
intentions face the general market process that is more complex than any intended 
engineering of its participants (Mises & Hayek 1997, p. 12), so that the need for social 
sciences and their theoretical explanations should not be questioned. 
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3. CRITIQUE OF PSYCHOLOGISM  
The fact that the two leading proponents of methodological individualism are at the 
same time critics of psychologism, and that their anti-psychologism strengthened to such 
an extent that they can be understood as having left the positions of methodological 
individualism (Udehn, 2002, p. 488), makes one think that there is a kind of “methodological 
conflict” between individualism and psychologism. 
Clarification of the above-mentioned relationship first requires an answer to the 
question whether it is possible to look at economics as a science of behavior, completely 
independent of psychology, and then reflect on the relevance of opinion that the 
abandonment of the term “methodological individualism” actually means a break with 
psychologism. 
3.1. Economics as the science of behavior  
Attempt to define economics as the science of behavior is inevitably accompanied by 
the question of whether in this case psychology loses exclusive scientific rights to be the 
only science suitable for substantially studying behavior. In support of the unsustainability 
of equalizing “the science of behavior” and psychology, some economists argue that their 
discipline is also the science of behavior, in a way independent of psychology. However, 
such a statement requires an answer to the question: what is the difference between 
psychology and economics; do psychology and economics stand for alternative theories of 
behavior and are they different conceptual systems? 
If we start from the fact that both of them claim to be “the science of behavior”, 
attention in this case can be directed at finding empirical evidence to refute the position 
of one or another science. By all accounts, economists‟ resistance to psychology would 
not be easy at all, and would probably, in the world of established relationships among 
different social sciences, look rather unconvincing. At the same time, any attempt of 
equalization of economics and psychology is doomed to failure from the very start. 
Aspirations of economists to defend the dignity and the “leading” position of economics 
in the world of social sciences are confirmed by the phenomenon known as “economic 
imperialism”. The essential feature of the above-mentioned tendency, which marked the 
second half of the twentieth century in the field of social sciences, is reflected in the 
application of the economic approach in the process of analysis and explanation of 
phenomena that traditionally do not belong to the research subject of economics. The 
initial hypothesis is that the market laws do not apply only in the economic sphere of 
social life, but that they are basic guidelines of all other forms of social relationships and 
ties. It refers to raising the market to the level of universal human communication (Petrović 
& Stefanović, 2013, p. 234), which, among other things, moves some, for economic 
science, quite “exotic areas”, under the influence of market absolutisation, into the sphere of 
interest of economics and its research. On the other hand, a strong alternative to the 
above-mentioned tendency is the so-called “psychological imperialism”, which is based 
on the psychology conquest of the economic sphere of society, where the role of 
“colonized territories” is this time given to economics (Glaeser, 2004). 
The above-mentioned role reversal may be meaningful from the standpoint of a 
warning that, if economics retains its traditional distance from psychology, the idea that it 
studies the behavior of economic actors must be abandoned (Hudík, 2011, p. 148). Denial 
of the view that economics is the science of behavior makes it independent of 
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psychology. On the other hand, any attempt to show economics in the light of the science 
of behavior means affirmation of the viewpoint according to which economicsis closely 
related to psychology. In any case, it cannot be said that these two disciplines are 
mutually irrelevant. 
3.2. Abandoning the term “methodological individualism” and affirmation of 
“institutional individualism”  
The critique of psychologism, among other things, can be based on the need for the 
denial of methodological individualism, which, from the perspective of its dominant 
interpretation, raises the issue of sustainability of aprioristic theory of human action. In 
fact, the dominant interpretation of methodological individualism is associated with 
atomism, i.e. atomistic social ontology (Zwirn, 2007, p. 55). In support of this, one should 
reflect on Lawson‟s opinion (1997, p. 159), whose arguments rest on the theory that, in 
modern economics, the ontology of social atomism prevails, with its epistemological 
manifestation, as a form of reductionism. Supporters of methodological individualism 
consider it desirable to identify certain similarities and analogies regarding the functioning 
of the natural and economic systems. Thus, for example, one might assume that economic 
actors, i.e. individuals who act in the economic sphere of social life, are equivalent to 
atoms. Just like in physics, the hydrogen atom (H) is not defined in relation to the oxygen 
atom (O), the individual, along with their characteristics, is viewed independently from 
other individuals (although those other individuals, as a rule, form part of the social 
context). That means that individuals either have no relationship with each other, or if 
they have, their relationship has external character. In this regard, internal relations are 
not the subject of interest of the dominant interpretation of methodological individualism. 
This means that their constitution is determined independently of the respective context, and 
that they generate their own, separate, unchanging effects in relation to the initial conditions 
(Lawson, 2003, p. 14). 
In contrast to the above-mentioned understanding, appreciation of ontological 
arguments suggests that the fact that an individual does represent a social being, which is 
normally involved in relationships with others, cannot be endlessly denied. This has 
resulted in increasingly louder attitudes that the idea of a completely isolated individual, 
liberated from social impacts, should be declared factually untenable (Davis, 2003), and 
that, accordingly, the fiction that the society is comprised of a set of independent 
individuals, who realize their goals completely independently and on their own, should be 
left aside (Coleman, 1990, p. 300). 
Hayek offers almost the same vision of the place and role of the individual, in the 
process of explanation of the social whole, starting from the conceptual linking of certain 
parts. In fact, regardless of the fact that, in his analyses, he started from individuals who 
have a real existence only, he insisted on the result which occurs as an unintended 
consequence of individual actions, thus “provoking” the debate about whether and how 
“loyal” he is to methodological individualism. Hence it is not surprising that some 
authors found inspiration for conceptual differentiation of methodological individualism 
from methodological atomism in his concept of spontaneous order. For instance, G. 
Zwirn (2007, pp. 76-77) is without prejudice to Hayek‟s commitment to methodological 
individualism, but he believes that he, with his concept of spontaneous order, actually 
rejected the idea of methodological atomism. The methodological atomism and the 
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related atomistic social ontology are diametrically opposite to Hayek‟s view that the 
causal relationships in society generate spontaneous social order. 
Hodgson brings the justification of the use of the term methodological individualism 
(Hodgson, 2007, p. 220) in connection with the obvious confusion that reigns with the 
original interpretation of the methodological individualism in the sense that: 
 Social phenomena should be explained by starting solely from individuals; or 
 Social phenomena should be explained by starting from individuals and 
relationships between them. 
The first of these versions, as Hodgson believes, has never been realized in practice. 
According to an individualistic approach, based on the understanding of individuals as 
isolated individuals, the whole cannot show the characteristics or quality if components 
do not have the respective characteristic or quality. Characteristics of the system simply 
reflect the characteristics of component parts, which makes the emerging characteristics 
excluded. However, individualism has just been criticized for not taking into account the 
relationship between the actors and their influence on the occurrence of appropriate 
characteristics at the macro or system-wide level, which are not present at the level of 
individuals. In the case of another version, however, the issue of justification of the use of 
the term “methodological individualism” arises, since it recognizes the existence of 
interactive relationships between individuals. This allows the analysis to include 
important holistic elements, which, at the theoretical level, affirms the concepts such as 
institutional and structural individualism. 
Notwithstanding the justification of identification of the individualistic with the 
psychologistic method (Popper, [1945] 1960, p. 91), as an alternative to psychologism, 
Popper proposes a methodology based on situational logic and institutionalism (Udehn, 
2002, p. 488). It is interesting that his idea that social institutions partly explain human 
activity may, inter alia, correspond to the widely accepted framework of game theory. 
Specifically, although the game theory can be seen as a continuation of behavior theory, 
claims that the problems of interaction are different from the problems of individual 
behavior can lead to the conclusion that these are not only psychological determinants. 
The basis of such thinking does not lie in the individuals themselves, but in the roles and 
strategies that they can take. That is why the concept of balance is different from its 
standard interpretation, bearing in mind that the balance is not the result of “players‟” 
conscious choice, but that it is achieved through frequency of strategies implemented under 
the action of the entire population. This means that the balance is not achieved by the 
conscious adjustment of “players‟” actions, but that it is the result of spontaneous self-
regulating process. All this, in fact, refers to the need for respecting the individualistic 
approach to the study of social phenomena, which, at the same time, does not symbolize the 
primacy of psychological factors. 
The conflict between individualism and institutionalism in Popper‟s methodology led 
to a split of methodological individualism into two parts: psychological individualism by 
Watkins and institutional individualism by Agassi and Jarvie. According to the advocates 
of psychological individualism, it is very problematic to assume that social science can be 
individualistic but not psychological, i.e. that the fact that it is individualistic does not 
mean that it is at the same time the science of behavior. In this regard, Hudík (2011, p. 
152) presents the view that Popper and Hayek did not provide convincing arguments 
about what  such a science should look like. Additional confusion was brought by the fact 
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that some supporters of the criticism of psychologism actually relied on the use of 
psychological formulations and specifications. 
Among those who defended the so-called psychological variant of methodological 
individualism,Watkins is particularly noteworthy. In his view (Watkins, 1955, p. 58), 
methodological individualism is first based on the ontological assumption by which all 
social phenomena are created or induced by the actions of individuals. In parallel, equally 
important is the epistemological assumption that reminds us that people have a direct 
insight into the actions of individuals, but not the action of social entities. Starting from the 
fact that all social phenomena, directly or indirectly, result from actions of individuals, this 
forces those who are engaged in their study to reduce them to a psychological term to be 
better explained (Watkins, 1952, pp. 28-29). In this regard, his aims were directed to the 
explanation of social phenomena, not the definition of collective concepts (Watkins, 1953, 
p. 729). 
Unlike the original version of methodological individualism, institutional individualism 
explicitly includes social institutions in order to thoroughly clarify the phenomenology of 
individual behavior. Among the authors who accept the importance of institutional influence 
for the formation of individual goals and objectives, one should certainly mention Agassi 
(1960), Jarvie (1972), and Boland (1982). They are characterized by the fact that, regardless of 
some inconsistencies in the use of individualistic and institutionalistic categories and terms, 
they emphasize institutional individualism as opposed to psychological individualism. 
 Efforts to verify the significant impact of institutions on economic decision-making, 
among other things, raises the question of their introduction into the very subject of 
economics, even if theoretical economics is understood as the science of behavior. In this 
way, on the one hand, one recognizes the fact that the actors have a strong foothold in the 
existing institutional framework, which essentially shapes their motivation, economic 
calculus, and willingness to innovate (Stefanović, 2012, p. 34). On the other hand, it may 
affect the segment of practical realization of economic research, in terms of the necessity 
of establishing rules and patterns of economic behavior in a society that is based on the 
interaction between individuals and social institutions (Polanyi, 1957, p. 248). 
Emphasizing the fact that individuals should be presented in the light of the rules of 
behavior that govern their actions (Field, 1979), and respecting the unintended result of 
individual actions, reduces the chances of economic science to fall under the 
“dictatorship” of psychology. Distancing in relation to understanding economic behavior 
built on the foundations of the glorification of action of psychological laws makes any 
intention aimed at the subjugation of economic science by psychology meaningless. On 
the other hand, only a clearly defined orientation of their scientific and research programs 
can contribute to creating conditions for an objective, comprehensive, and satisfactory 
explanation of economic behavior. Finally, thoughtful understanding of the differences 
and similarities between economics and psychology raises the awareness of economists 
that, in the circumstances of the evident need for using the results of psychological research, 
they should never forget that economic phenomena are characterized by a significant degree 
of autonomy and uniqueness, which was a long time ago articulated through the 
implementation of the requests for the constitution of economics as an independent 
scientific discipline. 
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CONCLUSION 
The view that economics is primarily the science of behavior prevails in economic 
literature. On the other hand, by nature and character of the research subject, psychology 
is a science that aims to maintain “exclusive right” to the status of the only one called 
upon to essentially deal with the study of behavior. In this regard, the question arises 
whether the definition of economics as the science of behavior necessarily goes in the 
direction of convergence with psychology, where the determination of the explicative 
primacy increasingly favors the advantages of “the psychological” in relation to “the 
social” and “the economic”. 
Starting from the above-raised issues, the paper first offered arguments about the 
close connection between economics and psychology, particularly in the area of interest 
in the theory of behavior. Then, the reasoning about the necessity of existence and 
maintenance of fundamental differences between their scientific and research programs 
was provided. In this sense, the focus was on the challenges of economics that do not 
relate to the problems of individual behavior and that cannot be reduced to the “action” of 
psychological laws in the economic sphere. Criticism of psychologism was, for these 
reasons, not posited on denying the need for the study of the behavior in itself. Instead, 
attention was focused on supporting the logical and empirical sustainability of the view, 
according to which the study of economic phenomena should be approached from the 
point of their social autonomy, uniqueness, and specificity. 
The above-mentioned characteristic of social and economic reality does not mean that 
it exists in itself, in the sense that it is the result of exogenous factors and that it develops 
regardless of activities carried out by individuals.The society is certainly the result of 
individual actions, which is why, inter alia, all theoretic explanations must come from 
individuals. However, although individuals act consciously, to satisfy their own interests, 
the result of their activities is a new quality, whose study is the task of economics, and 
which is not distinctive and recognizable in the individual behavior.Therefore, the study 
of this qualitatively different order cannot be accessed from the standpoint of the 
psychology of individuals. In fact, it is necessary to offer a theoretical explanation of the 
social whole, which relies on the conceptual linking of individual components and 
interpretation of causal relationships in society. 
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AUTENTIĈNOST EKONOMSKIH POJAVA U KONTEKSTU 
RASTUĆEG UTICAJA PSIHOLOGISTIĈKOG PRISTUPA 
Predmet ovog rada jeste odnos društvenog i psihološkog, s akcentom na naučnu zasnovanost 
jačanja uticaja psihologije na razumevanje ekonomske sfere društvenog života. U vezi s tim dat je 
kritički osvrt na različite koncepcije ekonomije kao nauke o ponašanju, odnosno njenoj 
ukorenjenosti u nauci o ponašanju. Opravdanost nastojanja usmerenog na to da ekonomija zadrži 
svoju tradicionalnu udaljenost od psihologije podržana je idejom o neophodnom priznanju 
interaktivnih odnosa i nenameravanih posledica ponašanja ekonomskih aktera. Pri tom je naučna 
relevantnost shvatanja po kome istraživanju ekonomskih pojava treba pristupiti s pozicije njihove 
društvene autonomnosti, posebnosti i specifičnosti argumentovana setom epistemoloških i logičkih 
nedoslednosti verovanja o  jednosmernoj uzročnosti psihološkog ka društvenom, usmeravajući time 
metodološka polazišta savremene ekonomske teorije u pravcu osporavanja pokušaja 
poistovećivanja individualističkog sa psihologističkim metodom. 
Ključne reči: psihologizam, nauka o ponašanju, metodološki individualizam, institucionalni 
individualizam 
